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In the context of on-going market reform in developing countries, there is a need for an 
improvement in the existing methods of spatial market efficiency analysis in order to better 
inform the debate toward designing and implementing new grain marketing policies, institutions, 
and infrastructure that facilitate the emergence of a well developed and competitive grain 
marketing system. The standard parity bounds model (PBM), while it overcomes many 
weaknesses of the conventional methods of spatial market efficiency analysis, it does not allow 
for the test of structural changes in spatial market efficiency as a result of policy changes. In this 
paper, building on the standard PBM, we develop an extended parity bounds model (EPBM). The 
EPBM is a stochastic gradual switching model with three trade regimes. The EPBM is estimated 
by maximum likelihood procedure and allows for tracing the time path and structural change in 
spatial market efficiency conditions due to the policy changes. We applied the EPBM to analyze 
the effect of grain marketing policy changes on spatial efficiency of maize and wheat markets in 
Ethiopia. The results show that the effect of policy changes on spatial market efficiency is not 
significant statistically in many cases; there is high probability of spatial inefficiency in maize and 
wheat markets before and after the policy changes. The implication of these results is that maize 
and wheat markets are characterized by periodic gluts and shortages, which can undermine the 
welfare of producers, grain traders and consumers. It is also observed that the nature of spatial 
inefficiency for maize and wheat markets is different implying that the two commodities might 
require different policy responses in order to improve spatial market efficiency. Maize traders 
made losses most of the time while wheat traders made excess profits most of the time covered by 
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GRAIN MARKETING POLICY CHANGES AND SPATIAL EFFICIENCY OF 













During the socialist Derg-regime, the Ethiopian government maintained a heavy 
interventionist approach in its grain marketing policies. Through marketing parastatals 
and cooperatives, the government controlled grain prices and restricted interregional 
grain movements and private traders participation in the grain trade. The effects of these 
policies on the development of grain markets, the agricultural sector, and the national 
economy have been well studied (e.g. Lirenso, 1987; Franzel et al., 1989; Dadi et al., 
1992). In more recent years, however, the Ethiopian government has embarked on 
various market reform measures to address the problem of poor grain market 
performance. Many questions remain regarding the speed of adjustment in grain market 
performance in response to policy changes, and how these policy changes are affecting 
spatial grain marketing efficiency in Ethiopia.  
 
It has been argued that the management of market reform requires an 
understanding of the operation of local markets, the strategies and responses of private 
traders, and how both relate to changes in the institutional and policy environment of 
markets (Kherallah et al., 2002). Such an understanding is crucial to the design, 
implementation, and evaluation of marketing policies, institutions, and marketing 
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infrastructure required for the development of grain markets. The key challenge now is to 
move beyond market liberalization to the issue of how to design input and output markets 
to catalyze smallholder productivity and income growth (Jayne et al., 2002).  
 
In spatial price analysis, the terms ￿spatial market efficiency￿ and ￿spatial market 
integration￿ are very widely used, sometimes interchangeably. However, there has been a 
growing recognition that these terms are related but not equivalent, and that there is a 
need to distinguish between them (Fackler, 1996; McNew, 1996; McNew and Fackler, 
1997; Fackler and Goodwin, 2001; Barrett et al., 2000; Barrett and Li, 2002). Spatial 
market efficiency is an equilibrium condition whereby all potential profitable spatial 
arbitrage opportunities are exploited.  Spatial efficiency is concerned with whether the 
optimal amount of trade is occurring. This optimality condition requires that spatial price 
differentials be less than or equal to transfer costs, equal with trade. If there is no trade, a 
spatial price differential less than transfer cost is also consistent with spatial market 
efficiency. However, if the spatial price differential is greater than transfer cost the 
market is inefficient either with or without trade.  
 
On the other hand, spatial market integration is defined as the extent to which 
demand and supply shocks arising in one location are transmitted to other locations 
(Fackler, 1996; McNew, 1996; McNew and Fackler, 1997; Fackler and Goodwin, 2001). 
Observing direct trade flows between two spatially distinct markets is a sufficient but not 
necessary condition for some degree of spatial market integration (Barrett et al., 2000; 
Barrett and Li, 2002). Direct trade linkages between regions are not necessary for spatial 
integration because if regions belong to a common trading network then price shocks 
may be transmitted indirectly through the network (Fackler and Goodwin, 2001). Markets 
that are not well integrated may transmit inaccurate price information that distorts 
marketing decisions and contributes to inefficient product movements (Goodwin and 
Schroeder, 1991).  
 
Market integration has usually been conceived in terms of the co-movements or 
long-run relationship between spatial prices (Fackler, 1996). However, spatial integration  
  7 
 
 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for spatial efficiency (and vice versa) so that tests for 
integration do not always generate the appropriate inference regarding spatial market 
efficiency (Fackler, 1996; McNew, 1997; McNew and Fackler, 1997; Fackler and 
Goodwin, 2001; Barrett et al., 2000; Barrett and Li, 2002). It is argued that the 
conventional methods assume methods assume stationary spatial marketing margins, 
stationary transfer costs, and/or that markets are linked by a constant trade pattern (uni-
directional and continuous). However, these assumptions are often violated and so the 
resulting test of market integration may be misleading and have adverse consequences on 
policy decisions. The development of the parity bounds model (PBM) represents one 
attempt to make the distinction between spatial market integration and spatial market 
efficiency more clear, while overcoming most of the weaknesses of the conventional 
methods of testing for market integration. When data on prices, transfer costs and trade 
flows are simultaneously available, the PBM allows a clear distinction between spatial 
market efficiency and spatial market integration (Barrett and Li, 2002).  
 
The effects of policy changes on spatial grain market efficiency can be either 
instantaneous or gradual. The standard PBM has been used mostly to analyze spatial 
grain market efficiency within a given (constant) marketing policy regime (e.g. Sexton et 
al., 1991; Fafchamps and Gavian, 1996; Baulch, 1997; Barrett et al., 2000; Barrett and Li, 
2002; Penzhorn and Arndt, 2002). In cases where it has been used to analyze the effects 
of marketing policy changes on spatial market efficiency, the effect of policy changes is 
assumed to be instantaneous (e.g. Park et al., 2002). This involves simply estimating a 
different PBM for different sub-periods, with each sub-period corresponding to a 
different policy regime. However, the PBM may be mis-specified and the results and 
policy implications might be misleading if the actual effect of marketing policy changes 
on spatial market efficiency is gradual and moves through a transition period, as might be 
expected in many cases. It may take some time for the traders to learn and understand the 
new marketing policy changes, assess its implications for reorganizing their businesses, 
make new investment and disinvestment decisions, and to access resources required to 
make the necessary adjustments in response to policy changes.  
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In general, the standard PBM does not allow for a test of a structural change in 
spatial grain market efficiency due to policy changes. Knowledge of the time path of the 
effects of market reform on spatial market efficiency would be very useful for properly 
assessing the effects of marketing policy changes on spatial market efficiency, and for 
designing marketing policies, institutions and marketing infrastructure. Thus, there is a 
need to improve and extend the standard PBM so that it allows for gradual transition 
between spatial market efficiency states as a result of changes in the policy environment, 
and to develop a test of whether such structural changes in spatial market efficiency are 
statistically significant.  
 
Another problem with implementing the PBM empirically is that time series data 
on transfer costs are rarely available, particularly in developing countries like Ethiopia. 
As a result, most empirical PBM studies have assumed transfer costs are equal to a 
constant plus a serially uncorrelated error for a given marketing policy regime (e.g. 
Sexton et al., 1991; Fafchamps and Gavian, 1996; Baulch, 1997; Barrett et al., 2000; 
Barrett and Li, 2002; Penzhorn and Arndt, 2002). However, this assumption is very 
restrictive, particularly when the PBM is used to analyze the effects of policy changes. 
This is because if transfer costs are assumed to be equal to a constant plus a serially 
uncorrelated error when they actually fluctuate systematically over time, then the PBM 
may misinterpret spatial price deviations as evidence of inefficiency when they are 
actually just a rational response to changes in transfer costs. Thus, there is a need to go 
beyond the conventional constant transfer cost assumptions and find better ways of using 
data that are available to construct more appropriate inferences about historical 
movements in transfer costs.  
 
In October 1999, in its continued market reform process, the Ethiopian 
government amalgamated the Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE) with the 
Ethiopian Oil Seeds and Pulses Export Corporation (EOPEC) and re-established it as a 
public enterprise. The amalgamated EGTE is not required to intervene directly to 
stabilize grain prices, and its major objective is commercial profitability by focusing on 
exportable grains (Bekele, 2002). The effect of the changes in the EGTE￿s organizational  
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structure and its reduced role in stabilizing grain prices, on spatial grain market efficiency 
has not been studied so far. Such information should be useful to policy makers, 
researchers, and donor communities interested in understanding the effects of grain price 
stabilization policy changes on grain market development in Ethiopia. It would inform 
the debate concerning the design and implementation of new grain marketing policies 
that facilitate the emergence of a well developed and competitive grain marketing system 
in Ethiopia, and may have implications for other developing countries involved in their 
own market reform processes.  
 
There are two major objectives in this study: (1) to provide an improved modeling 
approach for analyzing the adjustment path and the extent of structural change in spatial 
grain market efficiency in response to policy changes; and (2) to provide empirical 
evidence on the dynamic adjustment path of structural changes in spatial market 
efficiency for maize and wheat in Ethiopia as a result of grain marketing policy changes 
implemented in October 1999.  
 
A stochastic gradual switching model is developed which builds on the standard 
parity bounds model and extends it in two ways. First, the extended model traces the 
adjustment path of spatial efficiency changes in response to policy changes and tests 
whether the effect of a policy change is instantaneous or gradual. If it is gradual, the 
model also allows determination of the length of time required for the transition from old 
to new spatial efficiency regime. Second, the extended model allows for statistical tests 
for structural change in spatial efficiency regimes due to the policy changes. In the 
process of implementing the extended PBM model to study spatial market efficiency in 
Ethiopian grain markets, it is shown how the standard transfer cost assumptions can be 
generalized, even if a full time series of transfer cost data are not available, as long as one 
has access to cross-sectional transfer cost data for particular periods that have been 
collected via trader surveys and time series data on truck shipment freight rates.  
 
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows. The following 
section provides a detailed specification of the parity bounds model and extends it to  
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enable analysis of the dynamic effects of marketing policy changes on spatial grain 
market efficiency. The data sources and descriptions are given in section three. The 
empirical results for maize and wheat are presented in section four. Finally, the summary 
and conclusions are provided in section five.  
 
2.  EMPIRICAL MODEL  
 
In Ethiopia, there is a great diversity among different regions in terms of their 
agricultural production conditions such as soils, climate, and rainfall. As a result, it has 
been observed that some regions have excess supply while other regions have excess 
demand which gives rise to the possibility of interregional grain trade. This section 
discusses the conceptual framework for analyzing the performance of interregional grain 
trade in terms of efficiently allocating grain over space. Building on the standard parity 
bounds model, an empirical model that allows for an adjustment path and a test of 
structural change in spatial market efficiency due to policy changes is developed and 
outlined.  
 
2.1 CONCEPTUAL  FRAMEWORK 
 
 
A recent review of models used in spatial price analysis can be found in Fackler 
and Goodwin (2001). In general, empirical tests of the performance of spatially separated 
markets are conducted within the framework of spatial price equilibrium (SPE) theory 
developed by Enke (1951), Samuelson (1964) and Takayama and Judge (1964). The key 
prediction of this theory is that price relationships between spatially separated 
competitive markets depend on the size of transfer costs. In particular, in spatially 
efficient markets the price difference between regions engaged in trade should be less 
than or equal to transfer costs.  
 
Consider two markets located in different regions (i and j) that may engage in 
trade for a given homogenous commodity. For the two regional markets, the autarky  
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prices (prices which equalize the supply and demand in respective regional markets 
without trade) at time t for market i and j can be represented as:  
 
(1)  it it
A
it P ζ α + =  
 
(2)  jt jt
A
jt P ζ α + =  
 
where αit and αjt are time varying mean autarky prices which depend on supply and 
demand shifters in the local markets, and  it ζ  and  jt ζ  are stochastic disturbance terms 
affecting the autarky prices in the respective regional markets. The transfer costs, TCjit, 
for conducting interregional trade between the two regional markets at time t is modeled 
as a random variable with time varying mean transfer costs,  jit γ  and random component 
ejit: 
 
(3)  jit jit jit e TC + = γ  
 
where ejit is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σe
2 for all trade 
regime probabilities. Given the above formulation of autarky prices and transfer costs, 
three mutually exclusive and exhaustive spatial arbitrage conditions or trade regimes 
could be identified based on the relative sizes of contemporaneous spatial price 
differentials and transfer costs.
4  
 
In regime one, trade may or may not be occurring and the spatial price differential 
is equal to transfer cost:  
 
(4)  jit jt it TC P P = −  
                                                 
18 The assumption of contemporaneous relationship between spatial prices can also be relaxed. Thus, 
trading regimes that take into account the lag/lead relationships between the spatial market prices can also 
be formulated. 
  




where Pit and Pjt are contemporaneous prices in the i
th and j
th regional markets, 
respectively. This is a condition for a spatially efficient market either with or without 
trade. In this regime, due to competitive pressure in the marketing system, the traders are 
not making excessive or economic profits from regional trade. With trade between the 
two regional markets, the actual prices Pit and Pjt may differ from the autarky prices and 
the price movements in different markets are related due to changes in either market￿s 
supply and demand conditions or the stochastic disturbance terms.  
 




(5)  jit jt it TC P P < − . 
 
This regime represents a market condition where no profitable arbitrage 
opportunities exist between the two markets. The two markets may be in autarky but 
prices are efficient. However, if there is trade it is inefficient because traders are making 
losses. This indicates that efficient allocation does not necessarily require physical trade 
flows between markets. In this regime the autarky prices and the efficient prices are 
identical in the respective regional markets. The prices in the two regions are independent 
due to very high transfer costs, and shocks are not transmitted across the markets.  
 
Finally, regime three is given as a condition where trade may or may not be 
occurring and the spatial price differential is greater than the transfer cost:   
 
(6)  jit jt it TC P P > − .    
 
In this regime, the spatial arbitrage condition is violated and the markets are not 
efficient but may be integrated to some extent if some trade is occurring. In this regime, 
there are opportunities for profitable spatial arbitrage that are not being exploited. If the  
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markets are efficient, competition is expected to equalize the spatial price differentials 
and transfer costs, and the transfer costs are the largest price difference that can exist 
between two markets engaged in trade. It is argued that violation of the spatial arbitrage 
condition is an indication of the existence of impediments to trade between markets and 
should be considered as evidence supporting the lack of perfect market integration 
(Baulch, 1997). Among several conditions that may lead to regime three is the existence 
of transportation bottlenecks, non-competitive pricing practices, government controls on 
product flows between regions, government price support activities, licensing 
requirements, and quotas (Tomek and Robinson, 1990; Baulch, 1997). The empirical 
model is discussed next.  
 
 
2.2  THE EXTENDED PARITY BOUNDS MODEL 
 
The empirical model developed here to analyze the effects of the policy changes 
on spatial grain market efficiency is a stochastic gradual switching model. Building on 
the earlier work of Baulch (1997), Sexton et al. (1991) and Spiller and Wood (1988), this 
model extends the standard PBM in two ways. First, it traces the time path of the effects 
of the policy changes on the spatial efficiency regime probabilities. This allows 
determination of whether the effect of the policy changes is instantaneous or gradual and 
if it is gradual the approach also allows the determination of the time period required for 
the full effects of the policy changes to be realized. Thus, the extended model provides a 
better understanding of the nature of transition from old to new policy regime. Second, 
the extended PBM also allows for statistical tests of structural change in the probabilities 
of spatial efficiency regimes due to the policy changes.  
 
Let the probability of regimes one, two, and three defined as before be λ1, λ2, and 
λ3, respectively. Suppose that transfer costs are unobservable but known to be related to 
an (possibly biased) observable transfer cost estimate 
o
jit γ . Then, the unobservable 
transfer costs can be modeled as:  
  










jit γ  is the observable transfer cost estimate, β0 and β1 are unknown parameters and 
ejit is a random shock.
5  The 
o
jit γ  is also given as:  
 
(8)  ) ( 1 2 1 t jit t
o
jit FR P FR α α α γ + + =  
 
where α1 is the proportion of transport cost in the interregional grain trade 
computed from cross-sectional surveys of grain traders, FRt is the freight rate at time t 
and α2 is traders normal profit assumed to be 7% of the sum of grain purchase price (Pjit) 
plus  t FR 1 α .  Then, assuming that spatial prices and transfer costs are stochastic and the 
transfer cost between the two markets is independent of the direction of trade flows, we 
can redefine the conditions for regimes one, two and three given in equations (4), (5) and 




jit jt it e P P = − − − γ β β 1 0     
 
(10)  jit jit
o
jit jt it u e P P − = − − − γ β β 1 0     
 
(11)  jit jit
o
jit jt it v e P P + = − − − γ β β 1 0  
 
where ujit and vjit are non-negatively valued random variables that measure the 
deviation (if any) between price differentials and transfer costs. The error terms ejit, ujit, 
and vjit are assumed to be normal, half-normal, and half-normal independently distributed 
random variables with standard deviation equal to σe,  σu, and σv, respectively. The ejit is 
an error term which applies to the transfer costs. The ujit and vjit are composite error terms 
                                                 
5 The detailed discussion of the procedures used in the construction of grain transfer costs from cross-
sectional surveys of grain traders and time series data on truck shipment freight rates is given in section 3.    
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of the disturbance terms in the demand and supply functions for the pair of markets 
considered, and their magnitude depends on the relative imbalances between demand and 
supply in individual markets.  
 
In regime one, the markets are spatially efficient and the variance of the spatial 
price differentials is given by the variance of transfer costs between the two markets, σe
2. 
In other words, the variability in the spatial price differentials is explained fully by the 
variability in the transfer costs between the two markets. Then, the parity bounds (or 
confidence interval) for the spatial price differentials can be constructed using the 
variance of the disturbance term for regime one and the exogenously given or 
endogenously estimated transfer costs. Thus, the parity bounds for spatial price 
differentials can be given as 
o
jit γ β β 1 0 +  ± Zσe, where Z is a critical value for normal 
distribution at a given statistical significance level. On the other hand, the variance of the 
spatial price differentials under the autarky condition is given as σe
2 + σu
2 while the 




Let the contemporaneous difference between spatial price differentials and 
transfer costs be given as a random variable πt= |Pit-Pjt| - 
o
jit γ β β 1 0 − , where πt can be 
considered as expected ￿economic￿ profit made from regional trade.
6 Then, the joint 
probability density function for πt over the entire trading regime is given as:  
 
(12)  () () ( ) ( ) θ π λ λ θ π λ θ π λ θ π | ) 1 ( | | | 3 2 1 2 2 1 1 t t t t t t t t f f f f − − + + =  
 
where λ1, λ2 and λ3 =(1 - λ1 - λ2) are defined as before; the fit￿s are mixture normal 
distributions which are given for regime one, two, and three, respectively; and θ is a 
parameter vector (λ1, λ2,  λ3, β0, β1, σe
2, σu
2, and σv
2)  to be estimated. The probability 
density function for regime one is the ordinary normal density function while for regime 
                                                 
6 The spatial price differential is also corrected for losses during storage and transporting grain and the 
procedure used is discussed in chapter 6.  
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two and regime three the density functions are truncated half-normal density functions 
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where  ϕ (.) and Φ (.) denote the standard normal probability density and 
cumulative distribution functions, respectively.  
 
The likelihood function for πt based on the joint probability density functions 
defined above for the different trade regimes over the entire study period is given as:  
 
   
(16) [] ∏
=
− − + + =
T
t
t t t f f f L
1
3 2 1 2 2 1 1 ) 1 ( λ λ λ λ . 
 
The parameters can be obtained by maximizing the logarithm of the above 
likelihood function using numerical optimization. However, this is the standard PBM that 
does not allow us to see the adjustment paths and the effects of the policy changes on the 
probabilities of different trade regimes.  
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Park et al. (2002) were the first to apply the PBM to analyze the effects of market 
reform on spatial market efficiency. Park et al. (2002) estimated the relative frequencies 
of realized spatial arbitrage opportunities for Chinese grain markets over four sub-periods 
under the implicit assumption that the effects of policy changes on the regime 
probabilities are instantaneous. Here, however, we allow both for instantaneous and 
gradual change in regime probabilities due to the policy changes. In other words, our 
model allows us to estimate the length of adjustment period required for the full effects of 
policy changes to be realized.  
 
Our proposed PBM extension changes the standard PBM from a stochastic 
switching model to a stochastic switching model with gradual probability changes. 
Hereafter we call this the extended parity bounds model (EPBM). The model allows the 
identification of time paths characterizing the structural changes in regime probabilities 
as a result of the policy changes. It is possible that there may be immediate adjustment 
from the old to the new policy regime, which implies that the full effects of the policy 
changes are instantaneous or abrupt. However, the assumption of instantaneous 
adjustment in market conditions in response to policy changes may be unrealistic. It 
might take some time for the traders to learn and understand the new policy changes, 
assess the implications for reorganizing their business, make investment and 
disinvestment decisions, and to obtain resources required to make necessary adjustments. 
The EPBM allows determining the path of structural changes in regime probabilities as a 
result of the policy changes.
7    
                                                 
7 The information on the nature of the adjustment path across several markets is useful to see if there are 
differential responses to policy changes among different markets and to determine what policy changes are 
required in order to speed up the response. 
  




To accomplish the above objectives we modify the joint probability density 
function and likelihood function for standard PBM given in (12) and (13) as follows:  
 
(17) 
() () ( ) ( )( )
() ( ) θ π δ δ λ λ
θ π δ θ π λ θ π δ θ π λ θ π
| 1
| | | | |
3 2 1 2 1
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
t t t t
t t t t t t t t t t t t
f D D
f D f f D f f
− − − −




() [ ] ∏
=
− − − − + + + + =
T
t
t t t t t t t t t f D D f D f f D f L
1
3 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 δ δ λ λ δ λ δ λ  
where δk measures the structural change in the probability of being in regime k 
due to the policy changes and Dt is a transition variable, which characterizes the 
alternative time path of structural change in regime probabilities and is constructed 
following Ohtani and Katayama (1986) as described below.  
 
Let the end date of the old marketing policy regime and the beginning date for 
realization of the full effect of the new policy on regime probabilities be denoted by τ1 
and τ2, respectively. Then, Dt takes the value of 0 for τ1 and earlier dates, between 0 and 1 
for the period between τ1 and τ2, and 1 for τ2 and later dates. The length of period 
between τ1 and τ2 represents the length of transition period required for the adjustment in 
the grain marketing system before the full effects of the policy changes on trade regime 
probabilities are realized.  
 
The pattern of transition from τ1 to τ2 can be represented using different functional 
forms (linear or non-linear). Figure 2.1 shows alternative linear time paths for the 
transition from τ1 to τ2 as represented by different Dt￿s. For example, if the length of 
transition period is 10 months then 1/10 (10%) of the adjustment occurs every month and 
by the 5
th month half of the adjustment is complete. Thus, the linear functional form for 
the transition period assumes constant speed of adjustment over the whole transition  




8  In our model, τ1 is known but τ2 is treated as a parameter to be estimated. The 
log likelihood function is maximized for different possible τ2 values and the τ2 value that 
has the maximum log likelihood function is selected. The different lengths of transition 
period are captured by using N-τ1 different transition variables corresponding to each 
time period since the introduction of the new policy regime, where N is the total number 
of observations. In our case, N-τ1 is equal to 35 and thus the number of maximized log 
likelihood values is 35.   
 
The approach followed here is similar to that of Moschini and Meilke (1989), 
which is used in the estimation of the time path of structural change in U.S. meat 
demand. However, there is one basic difference between our approach and Moschini and 
Meilke (1989). In the case of Moschini and Meilke (1989), both the starting date (τ1) and 
the end date (τ2) are to be estimated from the model. But in our case the starting date is 
known and only the end date is to be estimated from the model. The optimum length of 
transition period is given by the length of time elapsed between τ1 and τ2. The case where 
τ2 is equal to τ1+1 (a period immediately after the policy changes) represents abrupt or 
instantaneous change in policy regime, which implies no transition period.  
 
On the other hand, τ2 greater than τ1+1 represents a gradual transition from old to 
the new policy regime. The length of transition period depends on the flexibility that 
grain traders have to make investment or disinvestment decisions as deemed necessary in 
response to the new marketing policy changes. It also depends on the extent of awareness 
of grain traders about the new marketing policy changes and how they perceive the 
effects of policy regime changes on their grain business operation. It can be hypothesized 
that different grain traders in different regions have different capacity and ability to 
assess and respond to changes in the marketing policy environment.  
 
                                                 
8 In other studies of structural changes, functional forms which allow for different speed of 
adjustment during the different times of the transition period are also used (for example, see: 
Goodwin and Brester, 1995).  
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The case where the effect of the policy changes is instantaneous is a special case 
of EPBM, which is equivalent to separately estimating the PBM parameters for different 
sub-periods. This corresponds to the Park et al. (2002) specification. The joint test of 
structural changes in all regime probabilities is conducted using the likelihood ratio test 
based on the restricted (no structural change) and unrestricted EPBM parameter 
estimations. The restricted EPBM is estimated by setting all δ￿s to zero which means 
under the null hypothesis of no structural change the LR test statistic is χ
2 distributed 
with three degrees of freedom. In addition, where the LR test shows significant structural 
change, individual t-tests are used to test significance of EPBM parameters. For example, 
statistically significant values for δk indicate that there has been structural change in the 
probability of trade regime k as a result of a given policy change.  
 
Thus, the probabilities for the different trade regimes are determined 
simultaneously for the three periods: (1) period before the policy changes, (2) during the 
transitional period, (3) the period during the full effect of the policy changes. For 
example, a time path of structural change in a regime probability where the probability 
has increased as a result of policy change is given for a hypothetical case in Figure 2.2. 
For the period before the policy changes, the probability estimates for the different trade 
regimes are given by λi. On the other hand, the probability estimates for the transition 
period and after the full effect of the policy changes is realized are given as:  
 
(19)  t i i D δ λ +  . 
 
Since the parameter estimates are probabilities, the probabilities for a given time 
period should add up to one over the entire trade regimes, which requires the impositions 
of the following restrictions during the estimation procedure:   
 
(20) 1 0 ≤ ≤ i λ  
 
(21) 1 0 ≤ + ≤ i i δ λ   




(22) 1 = ∑ i λ  
 
(23) 0 = ∑ i δ  
 
In general, the EPBM represents an improvement over the standard PBM in that it 
allows tracing of the time path and a statistical test of structural change in spatial market 
efficiency due to the policy changes. However, the EPBM also has several weaknesses 
similar to that of the standard PBM which are discussed by Fackler (1996). First, the 
results are often sensitive to the distributional assumptions made.  Second, the difficulty 
in accurately estimating the transfer costs might also bias the results. Third, there is also 
the identification problem that any estimated effects may be due to other changes that 
occurred around the time of the policy change.  
 
 
2.3 ESTIMATION  PROCEDURES 
 
There are four basic stages in EPBM estimation. The first stage is to collect grain 
prices and transfer cost data. The second stage is to specify the appropriate log likelihood 
function to be maximized using a maximization algorithm. The third stage is to determine 
the optimum time length required for the transition from old to new policy regime. The 
optimum time length is determined by maximizing the value of log likelihood function 
for all possible time lengths of transition period. Finally, the EPBM parameters estimates 
are obtained conditional on the optimum length of time required for the transition from 
the old to the new policy regime.  
 
The log likelihood function being maximized to obtain EPBM parameters 
estimates is highly non-linear. As a result, there are two major problems that might be 
encountered in numerical maximization: (1) the existence of multiple local maxima, and 
(2) lack of convergence. There are several strategies that can be used to tackle these  
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problems, as discussed in the TSP users guide (Hall and Cummins, 1999). These 
strategies include: (1) the choice of appropriate maximum likelihood estimation 
algorithm, (2) the choice of appropriate starting values, and (3) grid search on certain 
difficult parameters or full grid search on all parameters. In addition, graphical analysis 
of the relationship between spatial price differentials and the transfer costs series is also 
useful in assessing the EPBM estimates.   
 
There are several algorithms provided in TSP to maximize the log likelihood 
function. In our case, we used the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) algorithm, 
which is found to perform best in our situation as compared to other algorithms available. 
The BFGS uses analytic first derivatives and a rank one update approximation to the 
Hessian (Hall and Cummins, 1999). During the estimation procedure, the values of 
regime probabilities are restricted to the range between 0 and 1 and the standard 
deviations are also restricted to be positive using implicit functional forms.  
 
 
Figure 2.1  Alternative Linear Time Paths of Structural Change in Trade Regime 










































Figure 2.2  Time Path of Structural Change in Trade Regime Probability due to 
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3. DATA   
 
 
There are two cereal crops, white maize and white wheat (from now on, simply 
referred to as maize and wheat), which are considered in this study based on 
completeness of the dataset available, importance in interregional grain trade, and degree 
of homogeneity of consumer preferences. Teff, which is a very important staple crop in 
Ethiopia, is not included in this study due to the difficulties involved in examining spatial 
price relationships among regional teff markets. This is because teff varieties grown in 
different locations are heterogeneous and consumer preferences for these varieties are 
variable, but the available teff price data for Addis Ababa and other regional markets are 
based only on the color of teff. The more appropriate teff price data needed for spatial 
price analysis would be collected by color and origin of teff.  
 
The main data required for estimating the parity bounds model are wholesale 
grain prices for different markets, interregional grain transfer costs and the start date for 
the new policy regime. For this purpose, weekly wholesale maize and wheat price data 
are obtained from the Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE) for the period from 
August 1996 to August 2002. There are ten important markets, which are considered in 
this study, which are either from grain surplus areas or grain deficit areas. The markets 
selected from the surplus producing regions include Addis Ababa, Bale Robe, Hosanna, 
Jimma, Nazareth, Nekempte, and Shashemene, while the markets selected from the 
deficit regions include Dessie, Dire Dawa, and Mekele. Most of these markets are 
considered in the spatial price analysis of both maize and wheat, while few are 
considered only for either maize (e.g., Jimma and Nekempte) or wheat (e.g., Bale Robe 
and Hosanna).  
 
Since August of 1996, the EGTE has collected weekly price data for different 
varieties of five major cereal crops at different stages of the vertical marketing channels 
(producer, wholesale and retail) in 26 markets. The cereal crops consisted of maize 
(white and yellow), teff (white, mixed, and red), wheat (white, red, mixed, and food aid  
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wheat), sorghum (white, yellow, and red), and barley (white, black and mixed).
9 The 
price data are collected by EGTE field staff who transmit weekly price data to the 
EGTE￿s headquarters in Addis Ababa by telephone. Then, the price data are entered into 
computer spreadsheets and compiled for further analysis or for distribution of raw data to 
various users.  
 
The weekly price series are converted into monthly series by taking the 
unweighted mean of weekly price observations for a given month. The weekly price 
series is converted into monthly price series for two main reasons. First, the frequencies 
of transfer costs were monthly or annual, so monthly aggregation is needed to have 
comparable levels of aggregation for both wholesale prices and transfer costs. Second, 
the use of low frequency (monthly or annual) price data is recommended in order to 
allow sufficient time for the realization of inter-market arbitrage (Baulch, 1997).   
 
The EGTE has also collected qualitative weekly grain flow data for the same 
markets and this data available for the periods from August 1997 to June 1998 and from 
January 1999 to August 2002. The grain flow data collection was interrupted for six 
months, from July 1998 to December 1998. This period coincides with the last phase of 
the Grain Market Research Project. After GMRP was phased out in 1998, the grain price 
and flow data collection has continued with the financial support from the European 
Union (EU). For the selected commodities, the EGTE grain flow dataset consists of 
market level weekly data on total quantity purchased in the market, percentage purchased 
outside the market, the first and second most important sources of grain inflows to the 
market, total quantity sold in the market, percentage sold outside the market and the first 
and second most important destinations of grain outflows from the market.
10  
 
                                                 
9 A well-organized and systematic grain price and flow data collection was started by Grain Market 
Research Project (GMRP) in August of 1996 having EGTE as an institutional home. The Grain Market 
Research Project was a collaborative research project among Ministry of Economic Development and 
Cooperation (MEDaC) of Ethiopia, Michigan State University (MSU) and USAID/Ethiopa. 
10 The important sources and destinations markets are determined based on subjective assessment of 
EGTE￿s filed staff and no actual grain flows are recorded by sources and destinations.  
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Interregional grain transfer costs are estimated using cross-sectional surveys on 
marketing costs of interregional grain trade and time series truck shipment freight rates 
data. The marketing costs of interregional grain trade are calculated based on two cross-
sectional surveys of grain traders in Ethiopia. The first survey was conducted by Gabre-
Madhin in 1996 while the second one was conducted in 2002 by International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). 
These surveys document detailed marketing costs on the latest transaction involving 
either intraregional or interregional grain trade.  
 
Monthly and annual time series freight rates data are collected from MEDaC and 
the Ministry of Transport Authority (MTA) for the period from 1993 to 2002. The 
portion of freight rate dataset series which is available only on an annual basis is 
converted into a monthly series using a monthly freight rate index constructed from the 
monthly freight rate series. Next, the construction of estimate of total grain transfer costs 
using these two sources of data are discussed.  
 
A complete time series data on interregional grain transfer cost is rarely available, 
particularly in developing countries like Ethiopia. Given this problem, several approaches 
have been used in measuring the transfer costs data needed for the implementation of the 
PBM. If time series transfer cost data is readily available, it can be considered exogenous 
in the PBM analysis (e.g., Barrett et al., 2000; Barrett and Li, 2002). However, if time 
series transfer cost data is not available, there are two alternatives. The first alternative is 
to estimate the transfer costs using the PBM based on the observed spatial price 
differentials (e.g., Park et al., 2002). However, this implicitly assumes a time invariant 
transfer cost. The second alternative is to estimate transfer cost data either using the 
marketing cost computed from grain trader surveys and adjusting for inflation (e.g., 
Baulch, 1997) or inflating the time series transport cost data by a certain percentage to 
account for the unmeasured components of transfer costs (e.g., Penzhorn and Arndt, 
2002).  
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In our case, the specific procedures used in calculating interregional grain transfer 
costs data for the implementation of the EPBM are as follows. The first step is to 
calculate variable marketing costs for recently completed interregional grain trade from 
cross-sectional surveys of grain traders. Following Gabre-Madhin (1996), the marketing 
cost is classified into eight broad categories: sacking, handling, storage, transport, 
roadblocks, broker￿s service, travel, and tips and others. The average variable marketing 
costs estimated for both 1996 and 2002 are roughly the same, about 26 Birr/100 kg 
(Table 3.1). An examination of the structure of variable marketing costs indicates that the 
transport cost is one of the most important components of the cost. For example, in 1996 
about 61% of variable marketing cost is attributed to transport while in 2002 this 
percentage is 72%. The unweighted average percentage of transport cost in the variable 
marketing cost for the two sample grain traders￿ surveys is found to be 68.16%.
11 
 
In the second step, the computed unweighted average percentage of transport cost 
is applied to time series freight rate data in order to obtain time series data on variable 
marketing costs. For example, if transport cost accounts for 50% of the variable 
marketing cost then, the time series variable marketing cost data is generated by 
multiplying the time series freight rates by two.
12  
 
The opportunity cost of the wholesale grain trader as a manager of a grain 
business is also included in the computation of the variable marketing cost of regional 
grain trade. Thus, the computed value of interregional grain transfer cost is given as the 
sum of the variable marketing costs and regional grain traders￿ ￿normal￿ profit margin 
(see equation 8). In the context of regional grain trade, the ￿normal￿ profit margin could 
                                                 
11 The percentage of transport cost in the variable marketing cost is computed for the aggregate overall 
surveyed markets instead of computing it for individual markets or specific trade routes. This is because of 
limited number of observations for individual markets and trade routes in the grain trader surveys. The 
assumption of constant percentage of transport costs in marketing costs is very strong and implies that the 
only source of temporal variation in the transfer cost data is the freight rate. However, here the transfer cost 
computed from the trader￿s survey is used only as a starting point in the EPBM estimation. Hence the 
assumption of constant percentage might not be as restrictive as is it initially appears.  
 
12 The fixed/ operating costs like vehicle maintenance, storage and pest control, taxes and fees, wages, 
losses and costs of capital are difficult to obtain and are not included in the computation of marketing cost.   
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be the minimum profit the regional wholesale trader would be willing to accept to engage 
in interregional grain trade. In other words, the normal profit is what the regional trader 
would earn from the second best alternative employment. There is no readily available 
estimate of traders￿ normal profit in Ethiopia. In this study, following Dessalegn et al. 
(1998), the regional grain traders￿ normal profit is assumed to be 7% of the sum of 
wholesale grain price in the exporting market and variable grain marketing costs.
13 
Finally, the computed interregional grain transfer costs is used as a regressor in the 
subsequent parametric estimation of interregional grain transfer costs and trade regime 
probabilities using the EPBM.  
 
The spatial price differentials are obtained by taking the differences between the 
wholesale grain prices in the importing and exporting markets after adjusting the 
wholesale prices in the importing markets for grain losses (due to, for example, weight 
losses, pests, spillages, etc.,) in the process of exporting grain. In this study, an average of 
2.18% grain loss in transporting grain from one regional market to another is assumed 
based on the estimate from grain trader survey by Dessalegn et al. (1998). They indicated 
that 83% of the surveyed merchants experience weight loss ranging from 0.1% to 16%. 
Thus, the importing market wholesale prices are multiplied by 0.9782 (1-0.0218) to 











                                                 
13 Conceptually, the opportunity cost of those engaged in grain trade must be included in the computation 
of grain transfer cost. However, there is difficulty in obtaining accurate opportunity cost for managers of 
grain trade business and as a result very rough assumptions are made regarding trader￿s normal profit. For 
example, Baulch (1997) adds certain fixed margins to the freight rates in order to derive the transfer costs. 
In our case, the normal profit is given as 7% of marketing costs and grain purchase price in the export 
market. The actual normal profit margin could be lower or higher than 7%. However, this assumption may 
not have a very significant impact on the EPBM results as the transfer costs computed from trader surveys 
are used only as starting points in the parametric estimation of transfer costs using the EPBM.  





4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
 
Without information on the actual grain trade flow data, it is generally not 
possible to estimate the exact probabilities of being in spatially efficient and spatially 
inefficient regimes. This is because regime one (with or without trade) represents 
spatially efficient arbitrage and regime three (with or without trade) represents spatially 
inefficient arbitrage, but regime two could be either spatially efficient (without trade) or 
spatially inefficient (with trade). In the presence of a significant probability of regime 
two, actual trade flow data are required to separate the probability of regime two into 
spatially efficient and inefficient outcomes. The EGTE grain flow data is used in the 
interpretation of trade regime probabilities estimated by EPBM. Thus, in order to 
facilitate the presentation of empirical results we first provide a brief description of 
EGTE grain flow data involving the markets included in this study.  
 
  The minimum observed frequencies of maize and wheat trade flows for 
selected market pairs are given in Table 4.1. The frequency of flow data for a given 
market pair is determined based on the weekly observations of first and second most 
important sources and destinations markets for a given commodity.
14 The flow data is 
observed on a weekly basis and aggregated to monthly flow observations and the 
frequencies reported here are based on the number of months for which trade flow was 
observed out of the possible 26 months before the policy changes and 35 months after the 
policy changes.  
 
  The minimum frequency of maize flows between selected markets varied 
from 15% to 100%. The lowest frequency of maize flow is observed between Dire Dawa 
and Nazareth prior to the policy changes. After the policy changes, the frequency of 
                                                 
14 Furthermore, the frequencies are minimum observations because the information on trade flows when the 
market is less important (e.g., when a commodity ranks third, fourth, fifth, etc.,) as source or destination 
market is not collected. Thus the actual frequencies of trade flows could be equal or higher than the 
frequencies reported here.  
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maize flow decreased for 3 of 7 market pairs, increased for 3 of 7 market pairs and 
remained the same for one market pair. In the case of wheat, the frequency of trade flow 
varied from 39% to 100% for the period before the policy changes, and after the policy 
changes the frequency of trade flow increased in two cases, decreased in two cases and 
remained the same in three cases. In general, even with limited grain flow data, it is 
observed that most of the selected market pairs are linked by continuous trade flows for 
most of the time during the study period.  
 
 
4.1  EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR MAIZE 
 
Empirical results from the EPBM are given in Table 4.2 for selected maize market 
pairs.
15 The conditional maximum likelihood estimates of trade regime probabilities 
(λ￿s), the change in trade regime probabilities (δ￿s) due to the policy changes, and the 
standard deviations of profit for different trade regimes (σ￿s) are shown at the top of 
Table 4.2. The estimated lengths of transition periods, the values of the log likelihood for 
restricted (no structural change) and unrestricted estimations, the chi-square (χ
2) statistics 
for likelihood ratio (LR) tests of the joint hypothesis of no structural change in regime 
probabilities, and the number of observations used in the analysis are shown at the 
bottom of Table 4.2. The plots of the sizes of losses or gains from inefficient trade for 
selected maize market pairs are given in Figure 4.1.  
 
For the period before the policy changes, the probability of regime one (λ1), 
where the spatial price differential is equal to transfer cost, is less than 1% and 
statistically significant at the 1% level for 3 of 7 selected maize market pairs. It varied 
from 20% to 34% for the other 4 of 7 selected market pairs. Thus, prior to the policy 
changes, the probability of the spatial price differential being equal to transfer cost, which 
is consistent with spatial market efficiency whether or not trade is actually occurring, is 
very low for most market pairs and, less than 35% for all market pairs.  
                                                 
15 A Monte Carlo experiment is conducted to investigate the performance of EPBM estimation procedure 
and improve understanding of how the PBM works. The detailed discussion of the design and the results of 
simulation using the EPBM are given in Asfaw, 2004.   




On the other hand, the probability of regime two (λ2), where the spatial price 
differential is less than transfer cost, is found to be large and statistically significant at the 
10% level for all maize market pairs. For example, the probability of being in regime two 
prior to the policy changes are greater than 65% and statistically significant at the 1% 
level for 6 of 7 selected maize market pairs. Regime two can also be consistent with 
spatial market efficiency if no trade is occurring between the markets. If trade does occur 
in regime two, then it is presumably conducted at a loss, which would be inconsistent 
with spatial market efficiency.  
 
During the same pre-policy change period, the probabilities of regime three (λ3), 
where the spatial price differential is greater than transfer cost, is found to be small but 
statistically significant in most cases. The only large and statistically significant 
probability of regime three is observed between Addis Ababa and Mekele, which has a 
68% probability of regime three, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Of 
course, regime three is spatially inefficient whether there is trade or not because there are 
arbitrage profits from potential trade.  
 
In general, the period before the policy changes is characterized by large and 
statistically significant probabilities of the spatial price differential being less than 
transfer cost, while the probability of the spatial price differential being greater than or 
equal to transfer cost is generally small. This indicates that the probability of profitable 
spatial arbitrage opportunities (probability of regime one plus probability of regime three) 
for maize prior to the policy changes is very low for the selected maize market pairs. The 
fact that regime two dominates also indicates that there is a high probability that maize 
traders made losses during this period, if they engaged in actual trade.  
 
The one exception to the above conclusion is Addis Ababa ￿ Mekele, which was 
estimated to have a 68% probability of spatial price differential greater than transfer cost, 
indicating spatial inefficiency and potential gains from additional trade. This result is 
consistent with the observation of strict and persistent control on grain flows from Addis  
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Ababa to the Tigray region, which might have created maize shortages in Tigray and 
increased prices there. The purpose of the grain movement control was to raise tax 
revenue. The grain movement control was enforced through a roadblock raised at 
Alamata, a small town which is strategically situated on a major grain route connecting 
Addis Ababa to Mekele. It is a strategic location because grain traders who want to ship 
grain to Mekele from or via Addis Ababa do not have any better alternative route by 
which they can avoid this roadblock. Grain can also enter Tigray via Gonder in the North. 
However, this route involves longer distance and its costs may have exceeded the 
roadblock charge at Alamata. Thus, the ability of regional maize traders to take 
advantage of profitable spatial maize trade opportunities between Addis Ababa and the 
Tigray region is limited by this regional grain trade block.
16  
 
With very large and statistically significant estimated probability of spatial price 
differential less than grain transfer costs, one would generally expect very low maize 
flow among these markets during this period, because spatial arbitrage would be 
unprofitable. In other words, the probability of market segmentation is very high. 
However, a close examination of maize flow data between these markets during this 
period shows that there have indeed been frequent maize flows between these markets. 
This would suggest maize traders were engaged in maize trade but were making losses 
which indicate spatial inefficiency.
17  
 
For example, based on the EGTE￿s grain flow data, maize trade flow between 
Jimma and Addis Ababa and Wellega and Addis Ababa occurred at least for 95% of the 
months prior to the policy changes (Table 4.1). At the same time the probabilities of 
spatial price differential less than transfer cost is at least 75%. These results indicate there 
is high probability of spatial maize market inefficiency prior to the policy changes. 
Generally, western maize producing regions like Jimma and Wellega have a limited 
                                                 
16 The roadblock charges are included in the computation of grain transfer costs. However, it is difficult to 
capture the whole magnitude of the roadblock charge from a few cross-section surveys. For example, the 
time wasted at the roadblock, the spoilage and quality deterioration, missed market opportunities can￿t be 
easily quantified from cross-section surveys.   
17 This result might also be due to aggregation error in the prices and transfer costs which masks periods 
when trade was profitable.  
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export outlet for surplus maize production, and it is commonly observed that, even when 
prices are relatively low in Addis Ababa, maize exports to Addis continue from these 
regions. Hence, prices continue to fall in Addis Ababa. Grain traders in surplus producing 
regions have the option to sell their grain in their local markets when the price in Addis 
Ababa or other regional markets is not favorable. However, the surplus absorption 
capacities of local markets are limited.  
 
There are several factors which might cause spatial inefficiency of maize markets 
in which there is high probability of making losses by maize traders. First, the lack of 
well-developed storage facilities in maize supply markets might force the continuous 
flow of grain to central or other deficit markets, even if maize prices are not favorable in 
these markets. The rationale for this might be to reduce further revenue losses because of 
waiting for better price which might lead to spoilage, quality deterioration, and maize 
prices in the maize destination markets might also further decrease while waiting. 
Second, liquidity constraints and shortage of working capital due to missing or imperfect 
credit markets for grain traders can also force maize traders to liquidate grain, even if it 
means a loss. It has been observed that grain traders in Ethiopia have poor access to 
formal credit and other forms of financial services. The authors￿ personal observation of 
grain markets indicate that proceeds from current grain (e.g., maize) sales are used by 
grain traders for refinancing future grain purchases and settling other debts which 
indicate that the opportunity costs of capital tied up in grain stock is very high when the 
grain traders have limited access to credit.  
 
Third, regional maize wholesale traders might have difficulty matching profitable 
purchase and sale decisions due to inadequacy or unavailability of market information 
regarding future price movements and changes in supply and demand conditions in the 
source and destinations markets. Fourth, there may be too many maize traders but these 
traders might lack economies of scale in their operation contributing to higher cost of 
marketing. Fifth, maize traders might also be limited by their grain trading skills to adjust 
to the very dynamic grain marketing situations. 
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If inefficient (unprofitable) trades are taking place a natural question to ask is: 
how do maize grain traders survive in the long-run in the face of high probability of 
making losses? It is observed that the wholesale grain trade is not a specialized business 
in Ethiopia. Regional grain traders usually keep a diversified portfolio of business 
activities (grain and non-grain) and that might help to spread the risks. Regional grain 
traders also combine interregional grain trade activities with local grain trade activities. A 
lot of grain traders are also observed to operate without a license, while those with a 
license complain about the unfair competition from unlicensed grain traders (Dessalegn 
et al., 1998).  Operating without a license might allow grain traders (experienced or new) 
to enter and exit out of the grain trade sporadically, depending on market conditions, and 
still avoid government tax payments hence reducing their marketing costs.    
 
The other possible reason why the grain traders might survive could be due to the 
offsetting or compensating effects of fewer but larger gains for many but smaller losses. 
In order to investigate this issue we have computed the size of losses or gains from trade 
and plotted these for selected maize market pairs in Figure 4.1.  The sizes of losses or 
gains from trade are computed as a proportion of the difference between spatial price 
differential and transfer costs to the cost of grain plus the transfer cost. The plots show a 
few episodes of unusually very high gains for most maize market pairs and there are also 
episodes of very high losses. However, in order to exactly determine the compensating 
effects of larger gains we need data on the total volume of grain transacted.  
 
There are also indications that it might still be profitable for large-scale wholesale 
grain traders to engage in spatially profitable arbitrage even when smaller wholesale 
grain traders find it unprofitable. Osborne (1997) argues that large and small wholesale 
grain traders in Ethiopia have different cost structures because of economies of scale. 
This means that large wholesale traders can sell at the same price as the smaller traders 
and still make a profit because of lower cost.    
 
The standard deviations of ￿economic￿ profit from spatial arbitrage estimated for 
different trade regimes are statistically significant at the 5% level for 19 of 21 cases. For  
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each market pair, the standard deviation estimated for regime three (σv) is found to be the 
largest. As regime three is unambiguously inefficient, this indicates that the variability in 
the ￿economic￿ profit from spatial arbitrage is higher when the market is inefficient. It is 
also observed that the standard deviations of regime two are higher than that of regime 
one in 5 of 7 cases. The other important observation regarding variance estimates is that 
the standard deviations for market pairs involving Addis Ababa and deficit markets are 
larger than the standard deviations involving Addis Ababa and surplus markets. This 
indicates that the degree of risk in trading maize is relatively higher between Addis 
Ababa and grain deficit markets than Addis Ababa and grain surplus markets.  
 
Likelihood ratio (LR) statistics are used to test the joint hypothesis of no 
structural change in trade regime probabilities due to the policy changes for selected 
maize market pairs, after having estimated the optimal adjustment path to the policy 
changes.
18 The chi-square statistics for the LR tests are presented at the bottom of Table 
7.2. The results show that there is no statistically significant joint structural change in 
trade regime probabilities for 4 of 7 maize market pairs (Jimma and Addis Ababa, Addis 
Ababa and Dessie, Nazareth and Dire Dawa, and Shashamane and Dire Dawa) at the 10% 
level. On the other hand, the joint structural change in trade regime probabilities is 
statistically significant at the 5% level in 3 of 7 maize market-pairs, which include Addis 
Ababa and Nekempte, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa and Mekele.  
 
To some extent, the variation in the responses of regional maize markets to the 
recent policy changes can be explained by the history of government market 
interventions, which have varied from region to region and may have different effects on 
the levels of private sector grain development and grain traders￿ perceptions of risk and 
uncertainty. Generally, the markets where the policy change appears to have had little 
effect appear to be where the private sector grain trade already had been relatively more 
tolerated by the government marketing agencies during socialist regime (e.g., Nazareth 
and Shashamane).  
                                                 
18 Optimal adjustment paths were chosen based on a likelihood maximization procedure, as discussed 
earlier. The optimal adjustment path estimates will be explained in more detail below.  




During the socialist regime, it was observed that private grain trade in Southern 
Ethiopia was much more tolerated by government marketing agencies than in other 
regions of Ethiopia (Osborne, 1997). So the degree of risk and uncertainty perceived due 
to the presence of EGTE in these markets might have already been low and the recent 
policy changes might not bring significant change in the attitude and operations of private 
grain traders. On the other hand, the joint structural change in regime probabilities is 
statistically significant for trade between Nekempte and Addis Ababa. Nekempte is 
located in a maize surplus producing region and has historically been one of the major 
focuses of government marketing activities (private grain trade sector was highly 
suppressed). So in this case the changes in policy appear to have had an effect. Structural 
change is also significant for trade between Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa and Addis 
Ababa and Mekele markets. Dire Dawa and Mekele markets are also grain deficit areas 
where there had been heavy government intervention.    
 
Of three maize market pairs with statistically significant joint structural change in 
trade regime probabilities, Addis Ababa and Nekempte and Addis Ababa and Mekele 
adjusted to the new policy changes gradually over a period of less than or equal to six 
months while the trade between Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa adjusted instantaneously 
(Table 4.2). The variation in the length of transition period among market pairs indicates 
that the speed by with which grain traders adjust to new policy regimes may depend on 
their location. The market pairs where the speed of adjustment is gradual appear to be 
where the marketing infrastructure, like road network and grain storage, is relatively less 
developed (e.g., Nekempte) and the destination market is far from surplus producing 
areas and drought affected (e.g., Mekele). On the other hand, where the adjustment is 
instantaneous (Dire Dawa) infrastructure is more developed with grain traders engaging 
in relatively larger purchases having more storage capacity, longer experience in the 
grain trade, and better road networks connecting the markets with other regional markets.  
 
For markets where there is statistically significant structural change as a result of 
policy changes, individual t-tests on the structural change parameters (δ￿s) are evaluated  
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to investigate the effect of the policy changes on trade regimes probabilities. With the 
policy changes, there is a large shift to regime three for Addis Ababa and Nekempte and 
Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, which suggests unexploited spatial arbitrage opportunities 
have increased and spatial market efficiency has therefore declined. The probability of 
spatial price differential less than transfer cost also decreased for both market pairs but 
Addis Ababa and Nekempte experienced a large decrease, which is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. However, the change in the probability of spatial price 
differential equal to transfer cost is not statistically significant at the 5% level for both 
market pairs.  
 
For Addis Ababa and Mekele the probability of spatial price differential equal to 
transfer cost increased and the change is statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
probability of spatial price differential less than transfer cost also increased slightly but is 
not statistically significant at the 10% level. The probability of spatial price differential 
greater than transfer cost decreased considerably and this is statistically significant at the 
5% level. The large decrease in the probability of spatial price differential greater than 
transfer cost, and corresponding large increase in the probability of spatial price 
differential equal to transfer cost, suggests an increase in spatial market efficiency.  
 
In general, prior to the policy changes all the maize market pairs considered are 
spatially inefficient with high probability. It is observed that the probability of spatial 
price differential less than transfer cost is greater than 65% for 6 of 7 maize market pairs, 
while the frequency of trade flow observed for these market pairs appears to be 
significant. Together, these results indicate that grain traders were active but made loses 
during this period. In other words, too much trade was taking place relative to that which 
we would expect in a spatially efficient market. Policy changes had statistically 
significant effect on regime probabilities at the 5% level in 3 of 7 maize market pairs. 
However, as a result of the policy changes the spatial maize market efficiency has 
improved only for trade between Addis Ababa and Mekele, while for the other market 
pairs spatial efficiency either deteriorated (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa) or was not 
affected (the rest of market pairs).   





4.2 EMPIRICAL  RESULTS FOR WHEAT 
 
The empirical results for selected wheat market pairs are given in Table 4.3. The 
conditional maximum likelihood estimates of trade regime probabilities (λ￿s), the change 
in trade regime probabilities (δ￿s) due to the policy changes, and the standard deviations 
of profit for different trade regimes (σ￿s) are shown at the top of Table 4.3. The estimated 
lengths of transition period, the values of the log likelihood for restricted (no structural 
change) and unrestricted estimations, the chi-square (χ
2) statistics for LR tests of the joint 
hypothesis of no structural change in regime probabilities, and the number of 
observations used are shown at the bottom of Table 4.3. The plots of the sizes of losses or 
gains from inefficient trade for selected wheat market pairs are given in Figure 4.2.  
 
For the period before the policy changes, the probability of spatial price 
differential equal to transfer cost is less than 1 % and statistically significant at the 1% 
level for all wheat market pairs. Thus, the probability of the spatial price differential 
being equal to transfer cost, which is consistent with spatial market efficiency whether or 
not trade is actually occurring, is almost zero in all wheat market pairs.  
 
The probabilities of spatial price differential less than transfer cost are also found 
to be less than 1% and statistically significant at the 1% level for 5 of 7 wheat market 
pairs. The probability of spatial price differential less than transfer cost is greater than 
80% and statistically significant at the 1% level only for Addis Ababa and Dessie, and the 
Dire Dawa and Nazareth market pairs. From EGTE flow data (Table 4.1), it is observed 
that the frequencies of wheat flow for the same market pairs are 100% which indicate 
strong trade flows even when the price differential does not cover transfer cost. This is 
inconsistent with spatial market efficiency.  
 
However, prior to policy changes, the probabilities of spatial price differential 
greater than transfer cost are found to be very large and statistically significant at the 5%  
  39 
 
 
level in most of the cases. For example, in 5 of 7 selected wheat market pairs (Bale Robe 
and Addis Ababa, Hosanna and Addis Ababa, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, Addis Ababa 
and Mekele and Shashamane and Dire Dawa), the probability of spatial price differential 
greater than transfer cost is found to be greater than 99% and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. For the period before the policy changes, a small probability of spatial price 
differential greater than transfer cost is observed only between the Addis Ababa and 
Dessie, and Nazareth and Dire Dawa wheat market pairs.  
 
Thus, in the case of wheat, the period before the policy changes is characterized 
by large and statistically significant probability of spatial price differential greater than 
transfer cost, while the probability of spatial price differential less than or equal to 
transfer cost are, with few exceptions, very small and mostly not statistically significant. 
The very large probabilities of spatial price differential greater than transfer cost indicate 
that the wheat markets are spatially inefficient. This could be due to the lack of 
competition in wheat wholesale trade either in the production areas or consumption areas. 
This could also be due to shortages of wheat supply in these markets resulting from 
restrictions on grain movement such as through roadblocks at Alamata. The high 
probability estimates of regime three are consistent with the observations of high 
frequency of wheat flow between pairs of markets considered but the quantities supplied 
might not be sufficient to meet the local demand.  
 
Prior to the policy changes, the frequency of wheat trade flow between Addis 
Ababa and Bale Robe is 89% while it is 100% between Addis Ababa and Hosanna (Table 
4.1). However, given the normal or bumper harvests for most of the time before the 
policy changes, observing a high probability of spatial price differential greater than 
transfer cost is more consistent with lack of competition or due to restrictions in 
wholesale wheat trade than the shortages of wheat to be supplied to these markets. In this 
regard, a high concentration ratio of wheat wholesale trade is also observed for some 
markets like Shashamane and Nazareth (Dessalegn et al., 1998). A high concentration 
ratio is one of the conditions for anti-competitive behavior in the market. Even though 
wheat grain traders made profit most of the time during the study period, there are also  
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periods when wheat traders made very high losses (Figure 4.2). For example, for Addis 
Ababa and Mekele wheat market pairs a loss which is greater than 20% was observed.  
 
The standard deviations of ￿economic￿ profit from spatial arbitrage estimated for 
different trade regimes are statistically significant at the 5% level for 16 of 21 cases. For 
each wheat market pair, the standard deviation estimated for regime three (σv) is found to 
be the largest in 5 of 6 cases. As regime three is unambiguously inefficient, this also 
indicates that the variability in the ￿economic￿ profit from spatial arbitrage is higher 
when the market is spatially inefficient.  
 
Likelihood ratio (LR) statistics are used to test the joint hypothesis of no 
structural change in trade regime probabilities due to the policy changes for selected 
wheat market pairs. The chi-square statistics for the LR tests are presented at the bottom 
of Table 4.3. The results show that there is no statistically significant joint structural 
change in trade regime probabilities for 6 of 7 wheat market pairs, at the 10% level. On 
the other hand, the joint structural change in trade regime probabilities is statistically 
significant at the 5% level for just 1 of 7 wheat market pairs.  
 
Structural change due to the policy effect is significant only for Addis Ababa and 
Mekele, which also shows instantaneous adjustment to the policy changes. For this 
market pair, with the policy changes there is no change in the probability of spatial price 
differential equal to transfer cost. However, the probability of spatial price differential 
less than transfer cost increased and is statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
probability of spatial price differential greater than transfer cost also decreased and this 
decrease is statistically significant at the 5% level. This result is consistent with the 
decrease in trade flow between Addis Ababa and Mekele which changed from 92% prior 
to the policy changes to 66% after the policy changes (Table 4.1). In general, as result of 
policy changes, the trade between Addis Ababa and Mekele changed from a situation of 
too little trade (high probability of regime 3) to too much trade (high probability of 
regime 2). Under these conditions it seems that traders made losses while the consumers 
in Mekele market might have gained from the wheat price decrease. In most of the cases,  
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the Addis Ababa and Mekele market is observed to behave differently from other market 
pairs, which might be because of the roadblock charges and control on grain going to 
Tigray.  
 
Prior to the policy changes, all the wheat market pairs considered are spatially 
inefficient most of the time. In 5 of 7 market pairs, the probability of spatial price 
differential greater than transfer cost is statistically significant at the 5% level. This is 
inconsistent with spatial market efficiency. On the other hand, the probability of spatial 
price differential less than transfer cost is greater than 80% for 2 of 7 wheat market pairs, 
where high frequency of wheat trade flow was also observed for these market pairs. This 
is also consistent with spatial market inefficiency, as grain traders would have lost money 
if they actually traded during this period. The structural change is significant only for 
Addis Ababa and Mekele market pair, where the nature of spatial inefficiency changed 
from high probability of making excessive profit to high probability of making losses. 
Thus, following the policy changes wheat markets are still spatially inefficient.  
 
  
4.3 SUMMARY   
 
Prior to the policy changes, both maize and wheat markets appear to be spatially 
inefficient most of the time. The likelihood ratio test shows that there is statistically 
significant joint structural change in trade regime probabilities in 3 of 7 maize market 
pairs and in 1 of 7 wheat market pairs as a result of the policy changes. However, the 
policy changes did not bring any significant improvement on the spatial efficiency of 
maize and wheat markets except in the case of Addis Ababa and Mekele where the 
spatial efficiency of the maize market improved after the policy changes, and in the case 
of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa where the spatial market efficiency deteriorated for the 
maize market following the policy changes. Thus, maize and wheat markets are also 
spatially inefficient for most of the time after the policy changes.  
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However, it is observed that the nature of spatial inefficiency is different for 
maize and wheat markets. In the case of maize, spatial inefficiency is mostly due to the 
fact that there is high frequency of grain flow while there is high probability of spatial 
price differential less than grain transfer cost. In this case, if the grain traders are actually 
trading they are making losses. In the case of wheat the spatial market inefficiency is 
mostly due to high probability of spatial price differential greater than transfer cost. This 
is consistent with spatial market inefficiency whether or not there is trade, but indicates 
too little trade is occurring rather than too much.  
 
The fact that the nature of spatial market inefficiency observed for maize and 
wheat is different implies that the two commodities probably require a different policy 
response in order to improve spatial market efficiency. One of the possible reasons for 
the observed differences in the nature of spatial inefficiency between maize and wheat 
might be due to the difference in their market structures. The geographic locations of 
surplus maize and surplus wheat producing regions are different. Maize is produced 
mainly in the western regions of Ethiopia while wheat is grown in central regions of the 
country. The marketing infrastructure, particularly the road network, is relatively more 
developed in the central regions. Among other things, this might have attracted 
investment in storage and other marketing facilities in the wheat areas, which encouraged 
the development of relatively larger wholesale grain traders, which can influence wheat 
prices. The analysis of the structure and conduct of wholesale grain trade in Ethiopia by 
Dessalegn et al. (1998) also indicates that the wheat markets are more concentrated. On 
the other hand, the marketing infrastructure in the western region is less developed and 
the grain traders are expected to be smaller sized and maybe numerous compared to the 
central regions.   
 
Finally, as with empirical studies of spatial market efficiency, it is important to 
keep in mind that data and estimation methods have inherent weaknesses. For example, 
the results are sensitive to the accuracy of transfer cost estimated from the survey and and 
the distributional assumptions made. Therefore it is always important to interpret the  
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empirical results with caution and think critically about the implications of the results for 




Table 4.1  Minimum Observed Months of Trade Flows for Selected Maize and 
Wheat Market Pairs 
 
 
Note:  *The maximum possible number of monthly observations for the period before and after the 
  policy change is 26 and 35, respectively and figures in parenthesis are percentages of months 
  with trade flows.  
 
  1996:08 to  
1999:09 




Market pairs  Maize  Wheat  Maize  Wheat  Maize  Wheat 
Addis & Bale Robe  --  23(89)  --  34(97)  --  57(93) 
Addis & Dessie  22(85)
* 26(100)  35(100)  31(89)  57(93)  57(93) 
Addis & Dire Dawa  15(58)  26(100)  13(37)  35(100)  28(46)  61(100) 
Addis & Hosanna  --  26(100)  --  35(100)  --  61(100) 
Addis & Jimma  26(100)  --  35(100)  --  61(100)  -- 
Addis & Mekele  18(69)  24(92)  4(11)  23(66)  22(36)  47(77) 
Addis & Wollega  25(96)  --  35(100)  --  60(98)  -- 
Dire Dawa & Nazareth  4(15)  26(100)  0(0)  35(100)  4(7)  61(100) 
Dire Dawa & Shashamane  23(89)  10(39)  35(100)  34(97)  58(95)  44(72)  





Table 4.2  Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimates of EPBM for the Maize 
Markets  (1996:08 to 2002:08)  
 
Note:  Trade is more than 99% uni-directional, the first and second market in the list of market pairs 
  being the source and destination market, respectively. Note also that 
a, 
b and 
c indicate statistical 
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λ3  0.127 0.001
 a 0.110  0.001
 a 0.684
 a 0.001
 a 0.001 
           
Structural changes 
δ1  +0.997
 a +0.133  0.000  -0.325
 c +0.662
 b +0.588
 b -0.196 
δ2  -0.871
 a -0.762
 a +0.110  -0.233  +0.022  -0.796
 a +0.009 
δ3  -0.126 +0.629
 a -0.110  +0.558
 a -0.684
 a +0.208  +0.187
 c 

























             
Transition period (l)  0 6  35  0  5  0  0 
Log  likelihood             
   Restricted   -231.612  -259.456  -224.630  -297.220  -293.538  -292.277  -296.697 
   Unrestricted  -230.150  -251.988  -223.589  -289.548  -285.519  -289.469  -292.484 
LR  Test             
   χ
2(3) Statistics  2.90 14.936
 a 2.08  15.344
 a 16.038
 a 5.618  1.74 
Observations  73  73  73 73 73  73  72  





Table 4.3  Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimates of EPBM for the Wheat 
Markets (1996:08 to 2002:08) 
Note:   Trade is more than 99% uni-directional, the first and second market in the list of market pairs 
  being the source and destination market, respectively. Note also that 
a, 
b and 
c indicate statistical 
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 a 0.188  0.998
 a 
             
Structural changes 
δ1  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  +0.998
 a 0.000 
δ2  0.000 +0.109  0.000  0.000 +0.711
a -0.811
 a 0.000 
δ3  0.000 -0.109  0.000 0.000  -0.711
 a -0.187  0.000 


















 a 23.491  2.231  27.393
 a 23.096
 b 10.321 
            
Transition period (l)  0 0  3  2  0  4  0 
Log likelihood               
   Restricted   -289.931  -279.268  -71.106  -308.244  -33.041  -315.703  -312.793 
   Unrestricted  -289.931  -278.385  -71.106  -308.244  -20.799  -313.480  -312.753 
LR Test               
   χ
2 (3) Statistics  0.000 1.766  0.000  0.000  24.484
 a 4.446  7.818 
Observations 73  73  73  73  73  73  72  




Figure 4.1  Magnitude of Losses and Gains from Inefficient Trade for Maize   
 
            
            
            
            


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.2  Magnitude of Losses and Gains from Inefficient Trade for Wheat  
 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
In recent years, the Ethiopian government has embarked on various market reform 
measures aimed at improving grain market performance. Research is needed to improve 
understanding of the operation of grain markets, and the effects of policy changes on 
grain market development. The conventional methods which have been used to study 
spatial market efficiency and/or spatial market integration depend on an assessment of the 
co-movement of price series, or the long-run relationship between prices. These methods 
assume stationary spatial marketing margins, stationary transfer costs, and/or that markets 
are linked by a constant trade pattern (uni-directional and continuous). However, these 
assumptions are often violated and so the resulting tests of market integration may be 
misleading.  
 
The standard parity bounds model (PBM) represents one of the recent 
developments, which attempts to overcome some of the weaknesses of the conventional 
methods. The PBM allows for transfer costs and explicitly incorporates spatial arbitrage 
conditions in the test of spatial market efficiency. However, in the context of on-going 
market reform and policy changes in developing countries, the standard PBM needs 
further improvements in order to properly assess the effect of policy changes on spatial 
market efficiency. This is because the standard PBM has been used mostly to analyze 
spatial market efficiency within a given, constant policy regime. In cases where it has 
been used to analyze the effects of policy changes on spatial market efficiency, the effect 
of policy changes is assumed to be instantaneous. However, the PBM is mis-specified 
and the results and policy implications might be misleading if the actual effect of policy 
changes on spatial market efficiency is gradual and moves through a transition period, as 
might be expected in many cases.  
 
The EPBM is a stochastic gradual switching regression model with three trade 
regimes. The EPBM improves the standard parity bounds model in two ways. First, the 
EPBM allows a better understanding of the nature of transition from old to new policy  
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regimes, including whether it is gradual or instant. If it is gradual, the model also allows 
estimation of the length of time required for the full effects of policy changes to be 
realized. Second, it allows formal statistical tests to be undertaken for structural change in 
the probabilities of different trade regimes due to policy changes.  
 
The EPBM is estimated using maximum likelihood and utilizes data on observed 
wholesale grain prices for several regional markets in Ethiopia and grain transfer costs. 
One of the problems with implementing the PBM empirically is that time series data on 
transfer costs are rarely available, particularly in developing countries like Ethiopia. As a 
result, most empirical PBM studies have assumed transfer costs are constant over time for 
a given policy regime. However, this assumption is very restrictive, particularly when the 
PBM is used to analyze the effects of policy changes. This is because if transfer costs are 
assumed to be constant when they actually fluctuate considerably over time then the 
PBM may misinterpret spatial price deviations as evidence of inefficiency when they are 
actually just a rational response to changes in transfer costs. Thus, there is a need to go 
beyond the constant transfer cost assumption and find better ways of using data that are 
available to construct more appropriate inferences about historical movements in transfer 
costs. This paper also discusses a technique for parametric estimation of time variant 
grain transfer costs based on an initial computation of grain transfer costs using cross-
sectional surveys of grain traders in Ethiopia and time series truck shipment freight rate 
data.  
 
The EPBM is applied to examine the effects of grain price marketing policy 
changes implemented in October 1999 on spatial efficiency of maize and wheat markets 
in Ethiopia. The results indicate that there is considerable spatial inefficiency in maize 
and wheat markets in Ethiopia both before and after the policy changes. In most of the 
cases, the effect of policy changes on spatial grain market efficiency is not statistically 
significant. However, in cases where significant structural change did occur some 
markets adjusted to the policy changes gradually while others adjusted instantaneously. 
Thus, an instantaneous response to marketing policy changes cannot be taken for granted 
and needs to be tested empirically.   




The spatial inefficiency of maize and wheat markets indicates that resources are 
being misallocated in transferring maize and wheat from surplus producing regions to 
grain deficit regions of Ethiopia. There are several possible explanations of these results. 
First, maize and wheat markets are characterized by periodic localized gluts and 
shortages which can undermine the welfare of producers, grain traders and consumers by 
increasing price instability. Second, the marketing system lacks the capacity to provide 
timely and accurate price signals needed for efficient allocation of resources. Third, the 
marketing system does not provide adequate incentives for producers to adopt new 
technologies. Fourth, the high probability of making losses also decreases private sector 
participation in grain marketing.   
 
Finally, as with all empirical studies of spatial market efficiency, it is important to 
keep in mind that data and estimation methods have inherent weaknesses. For example, 
the results are sensitive to the accuracy of transfer costs estimated from the cross-
sectional survey of grain traders and time series truck shipment freight rate data. PBM 
results are also well known to be highly sensitive to the distributional assumptions made 
for the estimation method. Therefore it is always important to interpret the empirical 
results with caution and think critically about the implications of the results for the design 
and implementation of public policy. The other limitation of this study is that it only 
assesses the degree of spatial efficiency of grain markets and does not address the 
questions as to why the markets are not spatially efficient. Therefore, in order to provide 
relevant policy recommendations, it is important to identify the exact causes of spatial 
inefficiencies using available research results and through conducting new research.   
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